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EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE OBTAINED BY WIRE TAPPING:
AN ILLUSORY SAFEGUARD*
TiaOtUG often criticized as a police-state tactic, wire tapping has frequently
been employed by law enforcement officers to ease the gathering of evidence
against suspects.' To curb tapping by federal agents, the Supreme Court fif-
teen years ago construed the Communications Act of 1934 to forbid the
admission in federal criminal trials of evidence secured by tapping a defendant's
telephone.2 In the second Nardone case, the Court bolstered this anti-wire
tap policy by also excluding indirect evidence obtained from wire tap leads.3
Trial courts administer this exclusionary rule by examining the government's
evidence in a hearing held out of the jury's presence. Once a defendant proves
that his wires have been tapped, the judge must give the defendant an oppor-
*United States v. Frankfeld, 10O F. Supp. 934 (D. Aid. 1951).
1. For criticism of wire tapping, see Justice Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 476 (1923); BARTH, THE LOYALTY oF FRm IM 12 (Pozhet Boo!k
ed. 1952): "If wire tapping is an aid to the police in frustrating foreign agents, so is
riffing the mails, so is unrestricted search of private homes, so is summary arrest on
suspicion-the ominous knock on the door by night that came to be the symbol of the
Gestapo's terror. A great deal could be learned about crime by putting recording devices
in confessionals and in physicians' consulting rooms, by compelling wives to testify
against their husbands, by encouraging children to report the dangerous thoughts uttered
by their parents. The trouble with these techniques, whatever their utility in safeguarding
national security, is that a nation which countenances them ceases to be free." See S
XWVson, EvmEicE § 2184b (3d ed. 1940) for a defense of wire tapping. See generally
Rosenzweig, The Lazw of lViretapping, 32 ComuIEL L Q. 514, 33 id. 73 (1947).
2. Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937). The statute reads in part: "[N]o
person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge
or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such inter-
cepted communications to any person ....." 43 STAT. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 605 (Supp.
1951). In Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 433 (1928), the Supreme Court, Justices
Holmes, Brandeis, Stone and Butler dissenting, had held that wire tapping is not an
unconstitutional search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Thus
Congress is entirely free to deal with wire tapping as it wishes.
The ANardoie decision has been vigorously attacked. See, e.g., Notes, 6 Gzo. WASH.
L. Rnv. 326 (1938); 53 H.nv. L. REv. 863 (1940); S6 U. or PA. L. RPv. 436 (1933).
Critics stressed: (1) that the 1934 Act merely extended a similar prohibition of the
Federal Radio Commission Act of 1927 to wire communications, and that the latter
statute had never been regarded as forbidding government interception; (2) that a bill
expressly intended to forbid government wire tapping had failed to pass the House of
Representatives in 1929, and that no mention of such prohibition appears in any later
congressional debates; and (3) that in the absence of specific provisions to the contrary,
general words of a statute such as "no person" are not to be interpreted as applying to
the sovereign. But fifteen years of congressional failure to amend the statute strengthens
the Court's original interpretation.
3. Nardone v. United States, 303 U.S. 333 (1939). The first Nvardone decision,
Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937), had ruled only on the exclusion of actual
transcripts of intercepted messages.
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tunity to show a connection 'between the taps and the government's evidence. 4
The government then has the burden of proving that none of its evidence
derived directly or indirectly from wire tapping;r evidence not cleared of
suspicion is inadmissible at the trial.0 Repeated congressional refusals to
amend the Act and thus sanction federal wire tapping suggest tacit legislative
approval of the Court's firm policy.7
The Nardone rule has not, however, effectively deterred government use
of wire tap evidence. Despite continued Justice Department wire tapping-
particularly in subversive activities cases--only four wire tap hearings have
been reported. 9 The major barrier to securing the hearing has been the
necessity of proving that a wire tap occurred. Without such a showing, no
hearing need be held and the government is free to use evidence gained from
taps. And since wire tapping is not easily detected,10 it may be unusually
4. "The burden is, of course, on the accused in the first instance to prove to the trial
court's satisfaction that wire tapping was unlawfully employed. Once that is established
• . . the trial judge must give opportunity, however closely confined, to the accused to
prove that a substantial portion of the case against him was a fruit of the poisonous tree.
This leaves ample opportunity to the Government to convince the trial court that its proof
had an independent origin." Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
5. This is not explicit in the Nardone holding. See note 4 supra. But in United States
v. Goldstein, 120 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1941), Judge Learned Hand interpreted the Supreme
Court's language to require the government, when tapping has been shown, to prove that
its evidence was obtained from independent sources. Judge Hand stressed that only the
government could ordinarily know the source of its proof. The Supreme Court affirmed
the decision, but found it unnecessary to rule on burden of proof. Goldstein v. United
States, 316 U.S. 114 (1942).
6. United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 636 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 920
(1952).
7. Several bills authorizing government wire tapping were introduced almost im-
mediately after the Nardone decision. See, e.g., S. 3756, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938).
More recent proposals are, e.g., S. 595 and H.R. 3563, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949). All
of these bills were actively supported by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, see LowErN-
rHAL, TaE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INvESTIGATION 323-6 (1950), but none passed. See Coln-
ment, 2 STAN. L. REv. 744 (1950).
8. "It is no secret that the FBI does tap telephones in a very limited type of cases
with the express approval in each instance of the Attorney General of the United States,
but only in cases involving espionage, sabotage, grave risks to internal security, or when
human lives are in jeopardy." J. Edgar Hoover, A Comment on the Article "Loyalty
Among Government Employees," 58 YALE L. J. 401, 405 (1949).
9. United States v. Weiss, 34 F. Supp. 99 (S.D.N.Y. 1940); Goldman v. United
States, 316 U.S. 129 (1940); United States v. Coplon, 185 F,2d 629 (2d Cir. 1950),
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 920 (1952); United States v. Lewis, 87 F. Supp. 970 (D.
D.C. 1950). It is unlikely that many unreported hearings have taken place. None have
come to the attention of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. Com-
munication to the YALE LAw JOURNAL from W. H. Speck, Attorney, Division of Pro-
cedural Studies and Statistics, Administrative Office of the United States Courts, dated
February 25, 1952, on file in Yale Law Library.
10. Technological improvements in wire tap apparatus have eliminated the crackling
noises that once gave warning of wire tapping. See Berger, Tapping the Wires, The New
Yorker, June 18, 1938, p. 41.
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difficult to prove. Moreover, defense questioning of government witnesses
to determine if wires have been tapped is not permitted. 1 In the four re-
ported hearings, proof of the tap was obtained fortuitously. In one, the gov-
ernment had introduced wire tap transcripts at a previous trial.' 2 In two
others, unusual circumstances gave defendants notice of the tapping.13 In the
fourth, an FBI witness at the trial inadvertently mentioned that defendant's
phone had been tapped.14
The difficulties of proving that wire tapping took place were recently
demonstrated in United States v. Frankfeld.1' In moving for a pre-trial wire
tap hearing, 1 defendants submitted affidavits relating several incidents in
11. See, e.g., Transcript of Record, p. 2312, Coplon v. United States, 191 F2d 749
(D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 926 (1952). Objections to such questions are
sustained on the ground that no wire tap discussion can proceed until the defense first
proves the tap. See, e.g., id. at 706-7, 2312, 3928, 6652, 7281, 7323.
12. United States v. Weiss, 34 F. Supp. 99 (S.D.N.Y. 1940). Thinking that the
congressional ban did not apply to the communications in question, the Governmint
introduced the transcripts at Weiss' first trial. On remand from the Supremne Court,
United States v. Weiss, 308 U.S. 321 (1939), a pre-trial hearing was held. The
hearing mentioned in Goldstein v. United States, 120 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1941 ), is an
extension of the Weiss hearing, under a new name because of the withdrav\al of Weiss,
on a plea of guilty, from the case.
13. Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1940), involved the use of what was
later held to be a non-wire tapping instrumentality. In seeking to attach a detectaphone
-a sensitive sound-receiving apparatus-to the adjoining wall of defendants' offices,
FBI agents were forced to enlist the aid of building superintendents. The superintendents
later informed defendants of what had transpired, and a hearing was obtained. SLc
affidavits of Harry Raynor, Albert E. Frost, and George Fetherston, Transcript of
Record, pp. 33-40. In United States v. Lewis, 87 F. Supp. 970 (D. D.C. 1950), United
States Marshals raided a gambling establishment, and answered inc-,ming phne calls in
the course of arrest Although a pre-trial hearing was held, the district court was un-
convinced that such interception constituted wire tapping.
14. United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 920
(1952). See Note, 60 Y.La I.J. 736 (1951). Caught unaware by a wire tap question,
the FBI witness blurted out his answer before government att,.,rneys could object-
Communication to the YALE LAw JOURNAL from defense counsel Archibald Palmer, dated
March 18, 1952, on file in Yale Law Library. The incident does not appear in the record, but
its aftermath may be found on pp. 133-7 of Stenographer's Minutes, United States v.
Coplon, 185 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1950).
15. 100 F. Supp. 934 (D. Md. 1951). Defendants were indicted for violation of the
Smith Act, 54 STAT. 670 (1940), 18 U.S.C. § 23S5 (Supp. 1951).
16. Defendants' petition asked, in addition to the hearing, that the guVLrnment Le
made to remit to them "all discs, records, logs, transcripts and notes of .. . intercepted
telephonic communications, all reports concerning or mentioning such intercepted com-
munications, and the names, addresses, and official titles of all employees and agents of the
United States who participated in intercepting, noting, reporting on, or acting upon any
such intercepted communications"; that all evidence obtained through wire tap methods be
suppressed; and that the indictment be dismissed if hearings determined that it was obtained
on evidence illegally secured. Motion for Suppression of Evidence and Other Appropriate
Relief, United States v. Frankfeld, copy on file in Yale Law Library.
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which FBI knowledge of their movements was apparently secured through
wire tapping.17 In one situation, there were hints that the defense counsel's
phone had also been tapped.' 8 But in no instance could defendants prove
conclusively that there had been taps. In answer to the affidavits, the govern-
ment declared that no wire tap evidence would be introduced at the trial.
Significantly, the prosecution did not deny that wires had been tapped.10
The court refused to order the hearing. It held that the defendants had
failed to show that there had actually been wire tapping. The circumstantial
evidence fell short of "solidity" and revealed "an entire lack of definiteness."2
To order a hearing on such a faulty showing, the court said, would serve only
to reveal the government's case. Moreover, the court thought that the hearing
would serve no useful purpose in view of the government's assurance that no
wire tap evidence would be introduced. 21
The rigorous burden of proof the Frankfeld court imposed on defendants
is not necessarily required by Nardone. Although it admonished trial courts
to prevent "tenuous claims" from impeding "the rigorous administration of
justice, '22 the Supreme Court left case-to-case decisions to the sound discre-
tion of the trial judge.23 Moreover, the context of the Court's admonition
17. "On or about July 31, 1951 . . . I made an appointment to see [a] client at her
home on North Bond Street at about 5:00 P. M. The address was repeated over the
telephone .... When I left my office ... I was followed by two cars driven by Federal
Bureau of Investigation agents. However . . . I lost them in traffic. When I realized
that I was not being followed, I decided to check to make sure in my own mind as t,
whether or not the Federal Bureau of Investigation was using a wire tap on my telephone.
I drove to another part of Baltimore and made certain that I was not being followed. I
then parked on the street for about ten minutes and noticed that there was no one around
or near me that was interested in my presence. I then drove to the address on North
Bond Street. . . . [T]here were two cars with Federal Bureau of Investigation agents
waiting in the same block where I was keeping my appointment." Affidavit of defendant
Maurice L. Braverman, copy on file in Yale Law Library.
"I used the phone in my room to call a summer resort in New York State to make
reservations for myself. When I later arrived at the resort I was notified that about one
hour after I called for reservations, the Federal Bureau of Investigation called the resort
stating they knew I was coming to the resort and asking the resort management to keel)
the Federal Bureau of Investigation informed as to my arrival and departure." Affidavit
of defendant Regina Frankield, copy on file in Yale Law Library.
Several similar episodes convinced defendants that they had been under a three-year
period of wire tap surveillance. Affidavits of defendants Philip Frankfeld and Leroy H.
Wood, copies on file in Yale Law Library.
18. Affidavit of defendant Maurice L. Braverman, copy on file in Yale Law Library.
19. Affidavit of Bernard J. Flynn, United States Attorney for the District of Mary.
land, copy on file in Yale Law Library.
20. United States v. Frankfeld, 100 F. Supp. 934, 937, 938 (D. Md. 1951).
21. Id. at 938.
22. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 342 (1939).
23. "The civilized conduct of criminal trials cannot be confined within mechanical
rules. . . . Such a system as ours must, within the limits here indicated, rely on the
learning, good sense, fairness and courage of federal trial judges." Ibid.
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suggests that it refers to "tenuous claims" that particular evidence derives
from wire tapping rather than to claims that wire tapping had occurred.e 1 In
any event, the evidence offered by the Frankfeld defendants seems more than
merely "tenuous."
The district court's reliance on the government's promise not to use tainted
evidence also seems unwarranted. If wires have been tapped, a hearing should
be held regardless of government assurances.2- Determination of whether
particular evidence was obtained primarily from wire tapping or from inde-
pendent sources is a delicate calculation which cannot properly be left to the
government-a party in interest 20  Moreover, the court ignored the govern-
ment's strong implication-via a negative pregnant-that wires had in fact
been tapped.2 7
The Frankfeld case reveals the weakness of the Nardonc rule: it can operate
only if the government is careless. And even if the Frankfcfd defendants had
been granted a hearing, most defendants would still be protected more in
theory than in actuality since it would seldom be possible to amass as much
evidence as was produced in the Frankfeld case. Nor would relaxation of the
present ban against direct questioning of government witnesses help greatly.
Prosecution witnesses will rarely know if wire tapping has been used in a
particular instance. Arresting officers, for example, may not be told the
sources of FBI information.2s Similarly, the government prosecutor may
24. See Nardone v. United States, 303 U.S. 338, 341-2 (1939).
25. In Frankfeld tapping of the defense attorney's telephone was also alleged. Since
such action may in itself invalidate a conviction, Coplon v. United States, 191 F2d 749
(D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 926 (1952), the mere fact that the government
did not intend to introduce evidence obtained from the taps should not have precluded
inquiry about the taps.
26. Cf. It re Alemeida, 19 U.S.L ,Vmx 2543 (E.D. Pa. May 15, 1951), where a
convicted murderer was granted a writ of habeas corpus because of the failure of the District
Attorney to produce evidence favorable to defendant. To the District Attorney's state-
ment that the suppressed evidence was not material, the court answered: "But since when
have we seen fit in this country to leave such questions to the whim, the caprice, the
hatred or the favor of a prosecuting attorney?" Ibid.
27. Evasion of a direct answer to wire tap allegations is standard Justice Department
practice. See, e.g., United States v. Flynn, 103 F. Supp. 925 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), where
defendants sought to prove wire tapping through the conclusions of a skilled tech-
nician who had attached sensitive testing equipment to their phones, and determined there-
from that taps were being made. In opposing the pre-trial motion, United States Attorney
Myles J. Lane answered only that no evidence derived from wire tapping would be pre-
sented at the trial.
28. Thus FBI arresting agents in the Coplon prusecution, United State-S v. Copln.
185 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 920 (1952), received only terse
orders that told nothing beyond immediate operational plans. See affidavits uf Richar4
T. Hradsky, John F. Malley, Roger W. Robinson, T. J. McAndrews, Sapphio iAMiw-,
Catherine T. Condon, Brewer Wilson, and others, Special Agents of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, photostatic copies on file in Yale Law Library.
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receive only a list of FBI evidence which tells nothing of its origins. 20 Find-
ing a witness who has direct knowledge of the wire tap would probably prove
extremely difficult. In sum, Nardone gave victims of wire tapping an empty
right; vigorous action by Congress or self-discipline in the Department of
Justice are the only practical ways to halt official eavesdropping.
29. From records of the Coplon wire tap hearing it appears that prosecutors receive
FJBI investigative reports that apparently never refer to wire tapping as such. If the
source of evidence is even mentioned, the term "confidential informant" is generally used.
Transcript of Pre-Trial Record, p. 4061, United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629 (2d Cir.
1950), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 920 (1952).
